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Case No. 20100246-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Patricia Salazar Houston, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Reply Brief 
The following points are submitted in response to arguments raised in 
Defendant Houston's brief. For those matters not expressly addressed, the State 
relies on the arguments made in its opening brief. 
I. 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE IT ARISES FROM A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18A-l 
Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the State's 
appeal from a pretrial order dismissing this case. See Aplee. Br. at 7-14. She argues 
that the State can take such an appeal only by meeting both of the prerequisites 
outlined in State v. Troyer: (1) obtain a certification from the lower court that its 
grant of a suppression motion has substantially impaired the prosecution's case; and 
(2) obtain an order of dismissal with prejudice. See Aplee. Br. at 6; see also Troyer, 866 
P.2d 528,531 (Utah 1993). She argues that both requirements are necessary, despite 
the amendment of the jurisdictional statute to require only the first. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009). Further, she argues that neither 
prerequisite has been met in this case. See Aplee. Br. at 6-9. 
To the contrary, dismissal with prejudice is no longer required under the 
revised statute. Even if it were, the record clearly demonstrates that under the facts 
in this case, suppression of the evidence substantially impaired the State's case, and 
the State is unable to refile the charges should this Court affirm on appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 77-18a-
l(3)(b). 
A. Dismissal with Prejudice is Not Required Under the Present 
Statute 
Defendant argues that absent some express indication that the legislature 
intended to exclude Troyer's requirement of dismissal with prejudice from the 2005 
revision of section 77-18a-l(3)(b), this Court is bound by the requirement. See Aplee. 
Br. at 8-9. Her authority, however, fails to support her claim. She cites only to cases 
that stand for the proposition that when the legislature enacts or alters statutes that 
overrule the common law, there must be a concurrent expression of legislative 
intent to do so. See id. at 8-9 (citing C.T. ex rel Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f 33,977 
P.2d 479 (addressing punitive damages) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) and Gottling v. 
P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, Tflf 14, 29, 61 P.3d 989 (addressing the Utah Anti-
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Discrimination Act) (Durham, C.J., dissenting), and cases cited in Gottling). The 
authority on which Defendant relies does not support her argument because none of 
the cases involves a jurisdictional statute, and the jurisdictional statute at issue 
herein does not purport to alter or preempt the common law. Absent some 
authority for her claim that amendment of a jurisdictional statute requires an 
expression of legislative intent to distinguish prior case law, her challenge fails, and 
the post-Troyer amendment of the statute governs this case. 
B. The Record Demonstrates Both Substantial Impairment and 
the Inability to Ref ile Charges 
Defendant agrees with the State that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l requires that 
the suppression order substantially impair the prosecution's case before the State 
can appeal the resulting pre-trial dismissal order, and that no certification of 
substantial impairment is required if the record reflects the substantial impairment. 
See Aplee. Br. at 6. She then argues that despite the statements of both the trial court 
and defense counsel below that the suppression order substantially impaired the 
State's case, the record cannot establish substantial impairment absent a statement 
in agreement from the prosecutor, which statement is lacking here. See id. at 7. 
There is no need for such a statement, however, where the record amply 
supports the concession of defense counsel and the judge below. See Argument, 
infra. In any event, the prosecutor's conduct amply expressed her agreement with 
3 
the view of the judge and defense counsel when, upon the judge's expression of his 
belief that the State was unable to "proceed without the [suppressed] 
informationf,]" the prosecutor immediately requested that the case be dismissed. R. 
142:36. 
Defendant also concedes that to the extent that the requirement of a dismissal 
with prejudice is read into the jurisdictional statute, it may be met if the record 
reflects that the charges will not be refiled should this Court affirm on appeal. See 
id. at 6-7. The record here does not show as much, she argues, because the 
prosecution "may have or [may] obtain" additional evidence against Defendant 
with which to further pursue its prosecution. Id. at 7. Thus, the refiling of the 
charges, she claims, is "not an unrealistic possibility[,]" preventing the State from 
perfecting this appeal. Id. However, a reasoned review of the State's case refutes 
Defendant's arguments. 
Both the judge and defense counsel below recognized the serious effect the 
suppression order had on the State's case because the effect was so blatantly 
obvious. All of the evidence on which the charges were based derived from the stop 
of Defendant's car. The judge suppressed the evidence based solely on the lack of 
evidence to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. R. 135; R. 142:33-37. 
The evidence derived from the teamwork of Trooper Phil Rawlinson and Deputy 
4 
Avery Stewart. They were standing together talking outside a store when 
Defendant drove her car out of the store's parking lot. R. 142:112-14, 22. The off-
duty trooper pointed her out to Deputy Stewart, identified her by name, and told 
him that her license was revoked due to alcohol. R. 142:14, 17, 23. Relying on 
Trooper Rawlinson's information, Deputy Stewart immediately followed Defendant 
and stopped her. R. 142:23-24. At that time, neither officer had gotten any 
additional information from any other source. R. 142:26-27. As a result, any 
reasonable suspicion for the stop had to have come from the two officers. See Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,146 (1972) (whether a stop is justified under the Fourth 
Amendment depends on "the facts known to the officer[s] at the time" of the stop); 
State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 13,178 P.3d 908 ("[T]he collective knowledge 
doctrine .. . allows the objectively reasonable articulable suspicion to be based on 
the totality of the circumstances and 'the collective knowledge of all the officers 
involved.'") (quoting United States v. Watkins, No. 06-3271, 243 Fed.Appx. 356, 358 
(10th Cir. June 14,2007)) (additional quotations and citations omitted). Where both 
officers testified at the suppression hearing, and the court found their testimony 
insufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion for the stop, the resulting 
suppression of all evidence derived from the stop necessarily gutted the State's case. 
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The prosecutor's failure to expressly state as much does nothing to change the 
reality of it. 
Defendant contends that there remains "a reasonable possibility" that the 
State may refile the charges after adducing additional testimony from one of the 
officers or obtaining corroborative information from someone else. See Aplee. Br. at 
7. However, the only source for additional evidence to overcome the suppression 
motion was necessarily the two officers who had already testified. See Adams, 407 
U.S. at 146; Prows, 2007 UT App 409,113. Moreover, the law is settled that "when 
the State has the burden of proof and the record on appeal fails to sustain any theory 
of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence.'" 
State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 11, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 
1155, 1159 (Utah 1995)). Hence, not only was the State's case "substantially 
impaired" by the granting of the suppression motion, but there will be no refiling of 
tue ci targes siiouiu tuis v^ourt aitirm tue case on appeai. 
ii. 
THE EVIDENCE BELOW ESTABLISHED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THRC UGH THE COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
DOCTRINE 
The trial court concluded that the information obtained by Trooper Rawlinson 
when he "was down at the Driver's License Division a few days ago and. . . looked 
at the computer screen .. . certainly rises to the level" of reasonable suspicion. R. 
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142:35. It nevertheless ruled that Deputy Stewart's stop was not justified because 
Trooper Rawlinson failed to "articulate[]" that information to the deputy. See R. 
142:34-36. Defendant agrees with the State that the trial court erred in so ruling, 
conceding that an officer making a stop at the direction of another officer "need not 
be informed of the details underlying the originating officer's reasonable suspicion." 
Aplee. Br. at 10. However, she challenges the trial court's underlying conclusion— 
that the information known to Trooper Rawlinson established reasonable suspicion. 
See id. at 10-13. Her challenge lacks merit. 
Defendant argues that Trooper Rawlinson's testimony did not go far enough, 
that he harbored some doubt about the status of Defendant's license, and that he 
conceded that he himself would not rely solely on what he told Deputy Stewart if he 
were making the stop. See id. at 10-11,13. Her view of the facts is not supported by 
the record. 
First, Defendant claims that Trooper Rawlinson "conceded" that a first DUI 
conviction would result in a 90-day suspension while a second would bring a 
suspension of six-to-twelve months, implying that his belief that her license was 
suspended until 2012 was erroneous. Id. at 10-11. In fact, the trooper did not know 
the revocation period for a first DUI, and he stated the revocation period for a 
second DUI was one year. R. 142:16-17. Regardless, there was no evidence that the 
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revocation of her license had anything to do with a first or second DUL The trooper 
simply testified that when he checked her license on his computer in 2006, he 
discovered that the license was revoked "[u]ntil 2012." R. 142:10-11,16. Nothing in 
his subsequent checks caused him at any time to question that revocation date. 
Further, Trooper Rawlinson explained that when he verified the status of 
Defendant's license in 2007, he did so both through dispatch and on his own 
computer. R. 142:11-12. And, contrary to Defendant's claim (see Aplee. Br. at 11), he 
further testified that a mere two days before he made the stop in this case, he 
confirmed on a computer at the Driver's License Division that Defendant's license 
was still revoked. R. 142:14-15. The law is well settled that information obtained 
from such computer checks is sufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion 
supporting a stop. See Snedeker v. Rolfe, 2007 UT App 395, tlf 7-12,176 P.3d 444. 
Finally, Defendant points to Trooper Rawlinson's testimony "that he would 
check with dispatch or on his computer prior to stopping" someone suspected of 
driving on a revoked license, even if the information came from someone at the 
Driver's License Division. Aplee. Br. at 11. Defendant implies from this testimony 
that even Trooper Rawlinson would not consider his comments to Deputy Stewart 
to provide reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's car. See id. 
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There are two problems with this representation. First, it misrepresents the 
testimony. When asked what he would do if a citizen told him that a person's 
license was revoked, the trooper testified that he was not sure he would "trust that a 
citizen would know that" and would verify the information before making a stop. 
R. 142:19. However, when asked what he would do if the person with the 
information was from the Driver's License Division, the record reflects the following 
exchange: 
THE WITNESS: At that point, I'd probably stop them if it was the 
Drivers License person. 
THE COURT: Without checking to see or verify it yourself? 
THE WITNESS: I probably would stop the car. 
THE COURT: Without verifying that they had a -
THE WITNESS: If I had time to verify, I would. I would definitely verify. 
R. 142:19-20. In other words, he would find the information more credible from a 
source likely to have access to such information and would stop the car based on the 
information alone if he had no time to verify. 
Second, it wrongly implies that Trooper Rawlinson would not have 
considered his comments to Deputy Stewart to provide reasonable suspicion to stop 
Defendant's car. The trial court found that the information possessed by Trooper 
Rawlinson "certainly rises to the level" of reasonable suspicion. R. 142:35. He 
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simply faulted the trooper for failing to "articulate[]" it. Id. If the trooper's 
information established reasonable suspicion for the stop, then under the collective 
knowledge doctrine, the trooper's possession and use of that information as a basis 
for instructing the deputy to stop Defendant would establish reasonable suspicion, 
even where the information remains unspoken. See Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 13 
(applying the collective knowledge doctrine to the question of reasonable 
suspicion); see also State v. Talbot, 2010 UT App 352, | 13, 15 (the collective 
knowledge doctrine, or the fellow officer rule, provides that" facts known to law 
enforcement officers who are working together may be aggregated to determine 
whether there is probable cause for an arrest" and includes situations where one 
officer has probable cause and instructs another officer to act, but does not 
communicate the totality of the information in his possession to the second officer). 
Finally, the trial judge voiced some concern for the possibility of a computer 
glitch, of reinstatement of the license over the two-day gap, or of the occurrence of 
"a lot of things that coul J have happened." R. 142:34. His concern, however, lacks 
any record support. Not a word was said about the reliability or unreliability of the 
computers or the recordkeeping systems involved in tracking revocations and 
reinstatements. Such speculation is insufficient to undermine the collective 
knowledge of the officers. And, as reiterated by this Court in addressing an 
10 
officer's reliance on computer checks, '"a determination that reasonable suspicion 
exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct/" Snedeker, 2007 UT 
App 395, ^ 8 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,277 (2002)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal and 
should find that the Deputy Stewart had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant, 
should reinstate the charges, and should reverse the suppression of the State's 
evidence arising from the stop of Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted January*^ 2011. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah AttornevjSeneral 
^KRl£C. LEONARD / 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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